Tangled in Standing: Who Gets to Challenge a Trademark?

Rebecca Curtin filed an opposition to United Trademark Holdings’ attempt to register RAPUNZEL for dolls and toy figures in International Class 28 under 15 U.S.C. § 1063—the provision that, at least textually, invites “any person who believes that he would be damaged” by registration of a mark to oppose it.

Curtin took that invitation seriously. She argued that “Rapunzel” is not a brand name so much as a cultural inheritance: the name of a well-known fairytale character whose story is deeply embedded in the public domain. She claimed that the mark is not distinctive at all, but instead highly descriptive—if not outright generic—and merely informational under § 1052(e)(1). She concluded that UTH was attempting to snatch the name Rapunzel out of the public domain, which would prevent others from referring to their Rapunzel dolls, characters and toy figures by their true name — Rapunzel.

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board never reached those arguments. Instead, it focused on whether Curtin had standing to oppose the application in the first place. Applying the Supreme Court’s “zone of interests” framework from Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), the Board concluded that she did not. Despite the breadth of the phrase “any person,” the Board held that § 1063 does not extend to all factually injured parties. The Board said that a statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked, and finding that the purpose of the trademark statutes was to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition, concluded that the statute only protects plaintiffs with commercial interests.  2023 U.S.P.Q.2d 535, 2023 BL 152903 (T.T.A.B. 2023)

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed—both that Lexmark governs and that the TTAB had applied it correctly. A consumer, even one raising concerns about the public domain, does not fall within the class of plaintiffs authorized to bring an opposition under § 1063. In the court’s words, this statutory cause of action is “reserved for those with commercial interests.” 137 F.4th 1359, 2025 U.S.P.Q.2d 784 (Fed. Cir. 2025).

Curtin’s final stop was the Supreme Court of the United States, which on April 20, 2026, declined to review the Federal Circuit’s decision. That denial leaves intact a clear rule: consumers lack standing to challenge trademark registrations at the USPTO, even where the challenge is grounded in genericness or descriptiveness.

Professor Curtin may not be “any person” for purposes of the Lanham Act, but her effort to keep “Rapunzel” in the public domain is hard not to admire. Her quest ultimately came up short—but not without underscoring the gap between the statute’s broad language and its narrower judicial interpretation. The case is over. At last, she can let her hair down.