In University of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft Zur Foerderung der Wissenschaften E.V., [2016-1336] (March 23, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the case was not exceptional within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 285 and denying Max Planck’s motion for $8 million in attorney fees.
Dr. Thomas Tuschl and his colleagues published an article describing their various discoveries in the field of RNAi. Less than a month later, Dr. Brenda Bass of the University of Utah published a mini-review that summarized the state of RNAi research, focusing on Dr. Tuschl’s article. Dr. Tuschl read Dr. Bass’ minireview, recognized her hypothesis that 3’ overhangs may be relevant to RNAi, tested that hypothesis, and made the claimed invention.
The University of Utah sued Max Plank claiming that its employee, Dr. Bass, was a co-inventor. The claim of joint inventorship turned on alleged collaboration between Dr. Bass and Dr. Tuschl’s team that occurred over several conversations at various academic conferences. The Federal Circuit listed a number of admissions during Dr. Bass’ deposition that directly contradicted the University of Utah’s allegations that Dr. Bass collaborated with the Tuschl inventors. The Federal Circuit noted that the only supported allegation was that Dr. Bass and Dr. Tuschl met for dinner during a conference.
The district court reasoned that there was no evidence to support a finding of collaboration between Dr. Bass and the Tuschl team. While Dr. Bass’ mini-review was integral to the Tuschl inventors’ research, the mini-review was in the public domain by the time Dr. Tuschl relied on it. The district court concluded that Dr. Tuschl’s reliance on the mini-review could not, on its own, support a finding of collaboration, and was not included to find that the discussions at an academic conference could constitute the collaboration needed to establish joint inventorship.
Max Planck sought eight million dollars in attorneys’ fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285, arguing that the case was “exceptional” because: (1), in light of Dr. Bass’ deposition testimony, the University of Utah lacked any meaningful basis for filing its correction of inventorship suit; (2), the University of Utah’s delay in withdrawing its sole inventorship claim until the eve of summary judgment indicates that it knew its claim was meritless; and (3), the University of Utah’s claimed damages were extortionately high.
The district court found that it was clear that Dr. Bass’ review played some role in the invention, rejecting the first grounds. One the second point the district court actually credited the University for withdrawing its sole inventorship claim early. On the last point, the district court declined to find anything exceptional about the University of Utah’s position: “Although Utah may have been asking for pie in the sky, that does not differentiate this case from most patent cases.”
The Federal Circuit found that the district court provided a thorough explanation for why it did not find this case to be exceptional. Noting that there is no precise Octane Fitness frame-work, the Federal Circuit said that the district court explained why the University of Utah’s position did not stand out from other patent cases, and Octane Fitness does not require anything more. The Federal Circuit concluded:
The trial judge was in the best position to understand and weigh these issues. She had no obligation to write an opinion that reveals her assessment of every consideration. This court will not second guess her determination.
Although it played no role in the appeal, one has to wonder whether the $8 million in attorneys’ fees requested by Max Plank — which the district court called “jaw-dropping” — figured into the district court’s evaluation of the claim. When the district court said that “it is not grossly unjust to require Max Planck to bear its own costs,” was the court thinking that if it really took $8 million to defeat the University’s claims on Summary Judgment, were they really so exceptional?